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| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE   |                             |   |                               | Form Approved<br>OMB No. 0704-0188 |  |
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.  |                             |   |                               |                                    |  |
| 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)<br>(05-04-2012)   |                             | 2. REPORT TYPE<br>FINAL                     |                               | 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)       |  |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE<br>Humanitarian Assistance and 'Soft' Power Projection  |                             | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER                         |                               |                                    |  |
|   |                             | 5b. GRANT NUMBER                            |                               |                                    |  |
|   |                             | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER                  |                               |                                    |  |
| 6. AUTHOR(S)<br><br>LT Danny R. Bouie<br><br>Paper Advisor (if Any): N/A  |                             | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER                          |                               |                                    |  |
|   |                             | 5e. TASK NUMBER                             |                               |                                    |  |
|   |                             | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER                        |                               |                                    |  |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)<br><br>Joint Military Operations Department<br>Naval War College<br>686 Cushing Road<br>Newport, RI 02841-1207   |                             | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT<br>NUMBER |                               |                                    |  |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)   |                             | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)            |                               |                                    |  |
|   |                             | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT<br>NUMBER(S)   |                               |                                    |  |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT<br>Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.<br>Reference: DOD Directive 5230.24  |                             |   |                               |                                    |  |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.   |                             |   |                               |                                    |  |
| 14. ABSTRACT<br><br>Humanitarian Assistance is not normally associated with National Power Projection. However, the U.S. military is the primary element of national power used to project hard power and support humanitarian assistance operations globally. Commanders and joint planners alike have historically underestimated the strategic effects in the link between humanitarian assistance operations and its potential as a tool in projecting U.S. 'Soft' power using the military element. To better understand this linkage, the process must start with the way in which Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Recovery (HA/DR) are viewed. The two terms are used almost interchangeably at the tactical and operational levels. The military generally receives a great deal of media coverage during HA/DR operations, but this feeds the negative perception of the military being a reactionary force. At the theater/operational level, joint planners must make the connection between Humanitarian Assistance and 'Soft' Power Projection as they relate to the Commanders' Theater Security Cooperation Plans and the integration of all U.S. government agencies in their regions. |                             |   |                               |                                    |  |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS<br>Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Recovery (HA/DR), Power Projection, Soft Power, Hard Power  |                             |   |                               |                                    |  |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:   |                             |   | 17. LIMITATION<br>OF ABSTRACT | 18. NUMBER<br>OF PAGES<br><br>21   | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON<br>Chairman, JMO Dept        |
| a. REPORT<br>UNCLASSIFIED   | b. ABSTRACT<br>UNCLASSIFIED | c. THIS PAGE<br>UNCLASSIFIED                |                               |                                    | 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area<br>code)<br>401-841-3556 |

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.**

**Humanitarian Assistance and 'Soft' Power Projection**

**by**

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

**04 May 2012**

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## Paper Abstract

Humanitarian Assistance is not normally associated with National Power Projection. However, the U.S. military is the primary element of national power used to project hard power and support humanitarian assistance operations globally. Commanders and joint planners alike have historically underestimated the strategic effects in the link between humanitarian assistance operations and its potential as a tool in projecting U.S. 'Soft' power using the military element. To better understand this linkage, the process must start with the way in which Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Recovery (HA/DR) are viewed. The two terms are used almost interchangeably at the tactical and operational levels. The military generally receives a great deal of media coverage during HA/DR operations, but this feeds the negative perception of the military being a reactionary force. At the theater/operational level, joint planners must make the connection between Humanitarian Assistance and 'Soft' Power Projection as they relate to the Commanders' Theater Security Cooperation Plans and the integration of all U.S. government agencies in their regions.

## Introduction

*“Theater Security Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance – The Joint Force Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs shall actively partner with other U.S. Government agencies to pursue theater security cooperation to increase collective security skills with a wider range of partners. We seek to facilitate interagency and enable international interoperability before crises occur.”<sup>1</sup>*

*The National Military Strategy of the United States of America  
Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 08 February 2011*

“Is the military ready to fight the next war?” is often asked at the strategic and operational levels. A simple yes or no will not suffice. More importantly, how does one arrive at an answer based on an acceptable risk analysis? Similarly, can the same question be asked in the context of Humanitarian Assistance operations and the same rigor applied? A very easy answer is no, the military is not in the business of predicting when and where the next natural or man-made disaster will occur. As demonstrated after a 9.0 earthquake and tsunami devastated Japan in March 2011, the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) mobilized one of the largest Humanitarian Assistance /Disaster Recovery (HA/DR) efforts in recent history. This effort included not only military personnel, but interagency partners from a myriad of organizations of particular note was the presence of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) who immediately deployed the agency’s Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to the affected area, and the Department of Energy (DOE) who sent personnel to help address Japan’s nuclear concerns.

In January 2010, the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) faced a similar natural disaster when a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti. These two operations named OPERATION TOMODACHI and UNIFIED RESPONSE both had some valuable lessons learned for USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM, as well as other U.S. government agencies. The challenge is not so much in documenting the lessons, but how to effectively

translate them into a common language and make them available to the “humanitarian support community”<sup>2</sup> at large.

Humanitarian Assistance operations have the potential to be an area of opportunity for “theater commanders”<sup>3</sup> to leverage organic and non-organic capabilities extending their “operational reach”<sup>4</sup> without using traditional military “hard power”<sup>5</sup>. The intent is not for the military apparatus to take the lead, but to work in concert with USAID and other non-governmental agencies (NGO).

The first challenge will be getting past the perception of humanitarian assistance being synonymous with disaster recovery. The military receives a lot of the press for support given after a catastrophic event. However, a majority of the actual humanitarian assistance being conducted around the world is done by organizations supporting affected personnel that have nothing to do with news making natural disasters like earthquakes, tsunamis, or typhoons.

Joint planners at the theater commander level have traditionally failed to see the link between humanitarian assistance being conducted at the tactical level and (Phase Zero) shaping operations in support of the Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan. A change in military thinking and lexicon is warranted, which will lead to the eventual decoupling of Humanitarian Assistance (HA) from Disaster Recovery (DR), and its traditional highly reactionary roots, to being a method of U.S. Power Projection that uses the military in a proactive “soft power”<sup>6</sup> role.

This paper will challenge the current dogma that U.S. military humanitarian support must maintain the ‘status quo’ and remain reactionary. The decoupling will occur in three phases. First, humanitarian assistance will be given a fresh look, and it will be compared to Peace Operations. This comparison draws the connections that start the process of ‘Re-

thinking Humanitarian Assistance' at the theater commander level. Secondly, humanitarian assistance will be viewed as it relates to U.S. Power Projection. Lastly, a critical eye will be given to the current structure of the Theater Commanders' staffs as they relate to the unity of effort of the key players that provide support during humanitarian assistance operations.

### Re-Thinking Humanitarian Assistance Operations

Shrinking budgets, global climate change, and operational necessity are all factors that challenge the military's current concept of operations in support of humanitarian assistance. Now is the time for the military to 'Re-Think Humanitarian Assistance Operations' and the current rationale for providing support. To adequately understand humanitarian assistance, one must first view it from the lens of joint doctrine. Humanitarian Assistance is listed as one of the five functions of Stability Operations, which also includes Security, Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure, Rule of Law, and Governance and Participation.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, joint doctrine also defines the conditions, and the desired end state of humanitarian assistance as a function of Stability Operations:

“The humanitarian assistance function includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the social well-being of the population. Social well being is characterized by access and delivery of basic needs and services (water, food, shelter, sanitation and health services)...the restoration of a social fabric and community life.”<sup>8</sup>

Although, joint doctrine speaks of humanitarian assistance under the heading of Stability Operations, a logical comparison to Peace Operations can help expand the aperture of dialogue on the subject.

When the topic of Peace Operations is discussed, it is very easy to associate it with the United Nations who often participates in Peacekeeping missions. However, Peace Operations actually consists of five different types of operations: Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, Peace Building, Peacemaking, and Conflict Prevention.<sup>9</sup> Humanitarian Assistance is not considered a Peace Operation according to doctrine, but there are fundamentals of Peace Operations that will be helpful in the process of ‘Re-thinking Humanitarian Assistance’ and the military’s current and future roles.

Fifteen fundamentals apply specifically to Peace Operations, but only a few will be examined in the context of humanitarian assistance: Flexibility and Adaptability, Civil-Military Harmonization and Cooperation, Perseverance, and Mutual Respect and Cultural Awareness.<sup>10</sup> Flexibility and Adaptability are not new as they relate to traditional military hard power operations; however, in the context of humanitarian assistance the playing field is different from force versus force or symmetric versus asymmetric threats. This operational environment requires constant reassessment not only of desired operational effects of the humanitarian assistance operations, but also reassessment of their strategic implications. This is not a combat environment, but the target audience remains the same.

Civil-Military Harmonization and Cooperation in the humanitarian assistance operational area consists of mostly non-combatants that are the experts in the field of support operations. A very well known and established organization in this area is the International Red Cross, which has been helping victims of natural and man-made disasters since 1863.<sup>11</sup> The primary operators in this environment seek only non-lethal means to resolve conflicts and provide assistance. For many military personnel, this may be unfamiliar terrain where the



power brokers do not operate based on air superiority or sea control, but on trust built through relationships.

Perseverance in the humanitarian assistance is critical. This is not a sprint; the results may take years to see as the whole of government approach will be required using diplomatic, informational, military, and economic measures to achieve the desired end state in the region.

Mutual Respect and Cultural Awareness can arguably be described as the most important fundamental, “developing mutual respect, rapport, and cultural awareness among multinational partners takes times, patience, and the concerted efforts of leaders at all levels of command”<sup>12</sup>. The relationships developed by the host nation personnel, military commanders, staff personnel, other government agency personnel along with private/public non-governmental personnel will ultimately determine the success or failure of the operation. These relationships are not temporary in nature and will be relied upon quite often to solve current and future challenges that go beyond humanitarian assistance. These were not an all inclusive list of similarities between Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance Operations, but the points of reference may help shape further discussion on the current paradigm of thinking on the humanitarian assistance support provided by the military.

Military leaders at the Strategic and Operational levels of war must also be able to draw the parallels between Humanitarian Assistance Operations and U.S. Foreign Policy. The military supporting these operations cannot continue to be viewed as a function of availability or exercise participation only, but military support must be planned and executed as a key mission area that helps ensure stability in the assigned regions unpinning theater security and cooperation. Politics have traditionally influenced Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Recovery (HA/DR) efforts on whether to grant assistance and how much.<sup>13</sup> A visible sign of

U.S. foreign policy for many Americans is when they see U.S. military personnel conducting humanitarian assistance operations.<sup>14</sup> At its core humanitarian assistance's goal is to bring long term change, which will help lessen the chances of conflicts that often require hard power responses.

The Department of State (DOS) and USAID have clearly articulated in their planning guidance that they will be relying on the Department of Defense (DOD) to support future humanitarian assistance efforts.<sup>15</sup> Based on DOS/USAID strategic planning Fiscal Years 2007-2012, it is clear that supporting DOS/USAID will go beyond the military only assisting [when available], and this support requires the military to plan humanitarian assistance as a deliberate process as opposed to crisis action planning. Humanitarian Assistance as a planned operation also provides an opportunity for the U.S. to build trust and eventual relationships with former adversaries. Ultimately, the goal is to influence the hearts and minds of the local populations through “deterrence and expanded partnerships”<sup>16</sup> that allows the military to project the true power of the U.S. that is reflected in helping other nations.

#### Humanitarian Assistance and Power Projection

*“In this multimodal world, the military’s contribution to American leadership must be about more than power – it must be about our approach to exercising power.”<sup>17</sup>*

*The National Military Strategy of the United States of America  
Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 08 February 2011*

The U.S. military is well known throughout the world for its ability to project and use hard power in supporting American interests. As the nation and the armed forces confront the current challenges of globalization in an interconnected world that has no digital borders, an example like the “Arab Spring”<sup>18</sup> demonstrates that the use of hard power alone lacks the

required flexibility needed to defeat the anticipated challenges of the mid and latter 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Humanitarian Assistance operations allow the theater commander to use assigned forces to support other government agencies capitalizing on the whole of government approach to resolving theater issues.

The soft power role is not new for the military. Vietnam was a prime example of the U.S. military using soft power to impact a theater of war. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary (Rural) Development Support (CORDS) organization consisted of military and civilian leadership, which managed the Pacification Programs throughout Vietnam. This program was a historic example of the military using ‘soft power’ operations to support a largely ‘hard power’ campaign in Vietnam. In the context of this paper, the focus is on how the military operating in a permissive (Phase Zero/Shaping) role during humanitarian assistance operations can be better utilized to project power through non-kinetic tactical actions that link to operational objectives supporting the Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan and the objectives of the other governmental agencies in the region.

“Where is the nearest aircraft carrier?” is often the first question asked during times of high political tension. This question is important because it speaks to the point that America and the world identifies the aircraft carrier as a symbol of hard power projection. As the topic moves from the kinetic capability to diplomatic solutions, the effects of humanitarian assistance as it relates to the other elements of national power must be considered. The concept of “operational art”<sup>19</sup> must be applied by military leaders and planners in order to leverage the opportunities gained through humanitarian assistance operations that translate into strategic effects.

Humanitarian Assistance is a soft power tool that is available to theater commanders and can potentially extend their operational reach far beyond the expected results of kinetic effects. The use of soft power is far reaching and more than just a diplomatic tool.

“The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”<sup>20</sup>

Future conflicts will continue to be political in nature and may require less engagement by military personnel in a combat role, but will lend themselves to the U.S. supporting allies and partners through diplomacy and the military in a soft power role. As a vital element of U.S. national power “the U.S. military must adapt the capability to project soft power as a means of shaping the international community’s support for U.S. values and interests and effectively communicating the success of soft power operations”<sup>21</sup>. Humanitarian Assistance as an intentional pre-planned operation gives the commander the ability to cultivate the operational environment through the “six phase model”<sup>22</sup>.

Commanders at the theater level have the potential to demonstrate on the world stage that the military instrument of national power is not limited by the perception of being a one dimensional force of hard power, but that the military can effectively operate utilizing soft power to conduct actions that have possible implications that change the dynamics of the entire theater. “Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.”<sup>23</sup> The final phase in decoupling humanitarian assistance from disaster recovery requires unity of effort analysis.

## Unity of Effort

*“Hand Shake Con, ‘That’s it’ No memorandum of agreement. No memorandum of understanding... [t]he relationships are worked out on the scene, and they aren’t pretty. [I]t is Hand Shake Con, and that’s the way it works. It is consultative. It is behind the scene.”<sup>24</sup>*

*General Antony C. Zinni, USMC, Multinational Force Commander-Iraq  
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT*

The operational environment faced in humanitarian assistance operations involves many players with differing goals. Although, this environment is not centered on combat it does have similarities with the “counterinsurgency (COIN)”<sup>25</sup> operational environment as it pertains to three key areas: actors, integration, and focus primarily on local populace. The key actors that headline humanitarian and counterinsurgency operations are very similar:

- U.S. military personnel
- U.S. government agencies (DOS/USAID and DOA)
- Host Nation Civil Authorities
- Intergovernmental organizations (United Nations)
- Local population

This is not an all inclusive list, but it helps set the stage in identifying the players that make up the operational environment. Integrating these players is not the military commander’s sole responsibility nor does the authority exist for military leaders to lawfully control the actions of other government and non-government personnel during humanitarian assistance operations. The lines of efforts are very dispersed due to the lack of central control during disaster recovery and traditional humanitarian assistance operations. The unity of effort is also limited by the strategic messages and framework the U.S. military uses to conduct humanitarian operations.

U.S. military personnel conducting humanitarian assistance operations are generally nested underneath two central themes<sup>26</sup>:

1. Humanitarian assistance that provides support to alleviate urgent needs in a host nation. (disaster recovery)
2. Humanitarian assistance conducted as part of programs designed to increase the long term capacity of the host nation.

The military primarily spends most of its efforts providing humanitarian and civic assistance to host nations in conjunction with operational exercises. This typically involves medical readiness and construction projects, which are generally seen in the media via military public affairs. The second type of military humanitarian assistance involves the host nation's military forces. Military Civic Action (MCA) programs are humanitarian assistance tools that are available "to improve the [host nation] HN infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace, while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government"<sup>27</sup> these programs are about giving credibility to the local military forces. In contrast, the civilian side of the humanitarian continuum spends a majority of their time in long term work.

"Civil agencies, including international organizations (IOs) the Red Cross and nongovernment organizations, provide most humanitarian assistance with little or no help from the military. But these organizations can quickly be overwhelmed and requires military assistance due to events and a paucity of resources."<sup>28</sup>

The line of demarcation is quite clear in the humanitarian assistance arena.

The military doctrinally and operationally focuses on short term projects, exercises, and [force available] disaster recovery support, which validate the perception of the military being a reactionary force in humanitarian operations. Beyond the separation of focus between

the military and civilians that provide a majority of the actual humanitarian assistance globally, coordination and unity of effort must also be addressed by commanders and joint planners at the operational level. First, the military staffs at the operational/theater level are not synchronized as it relates to coordination of humanitarian assistance efforts. The directorate that manages humanitarian assistance operations varies from theater to theater. The J9 Directorate labeled as either Partnering or Interagency Partnering is generally a primary stakeholder in coordination with the various external agencies, but not necessarily involved in humanitarian assistance related activities. Even though, J9 orchestrates relationships between the staff and external activities the J3, J4, J5, or J7 depending on the theater of operations drives humanitarian assistance support in assigned region as typically a secondary operation. NATO has taken a different approach to humanitarian assistance operations.

“As NATO implements its Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, it has been suggested that NATO consider establishing ‘humanitarian CTFs’ that would allow for the participation of NGOs and IOs alongside national contributions, much as current CJTF concept provides for NATO lead military operations.”<sup>29</sup>

NATO has recognized the value of humanitarian assistance operations and its integration into the operational JTF staff, which far exceeds the traditional coordinating cell role.

“In 2008, SOUTHCOM had replaced the traditional J-code staff with functionally aligned directorates so as to fully integrate with interagency (IA) and NGOs...to achieve national and theater objectives.”<sup>30</sup> As a result of a mismatch between organizational structure and operational need, the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) faced a tremendous challenge as the lead military organization after a 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010.

Consequently, the commander quickly recognized that the functional structure was insufficient to support the challenges that Haiti presented after the earthquake, and directed the staff to reorganize into the traditional J-codes that were familiar and flexible.<sup>31</sup>

Coordination between the humanitarian assistance supporters is not centralized using a traditional military command and control (C2) structure. “Coordination structures vary from one operation to another, depending upon the situation, the mission, and the policies of host countries and donors.”<sup>32</sup> This is generally a point of contention for military leaders when it comes to supporting humanitarian operations other than pre-planned exercises. Historically, after disasters, the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) is set up as a point of coordination. The CMOC is similar in purpose to the traditional Joint or Tactical Operation Center, and is “designed to provide operational level coordination between the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and the other stakeholders”<sup>33</sup> participating in humanitarian assistance operations.

The CMOC, as a point of coordination, has the potential in theory to add value to any humanitarian assistance effort; however, as a center for operations it has no legal authority to set policies, direct any operations, and it has no required members. Although conceptually the CMOC can be structured as the main hub of coordination during humanitarian operations, it lacks the teeth and legal powers necessary to ensure all participants are working toward the same objectives. Unlike the Joint or Tactical Operations Center, the CMOC is only set up during disasters. Two main points of contention exist in humanitarian assistance operations that hinder unity of effort between the military, U.S. governmental agencies, and the public/private civilian participants:

1. Division of focus between the military and other civilian supporters



2. Lack of coordination structure in daily operations outside the scope of disaster recovery operations

These points of divisions are contrary to the methods military leaders are trained to operate. Military personnel are generally unfamiliar with humanitarian assistance operations and receive no formal training to work with non-government organizations. Even though, the theater commanders have no authority over NGOs that may be working to support humanitarian assistance operations, it is still imperative that commanders know where the NGOs are in theater and what they are doing. This is extremely important in situations that may require civilian personnel recovery by the military. The differing focus between the military and the other participants in humanitarian assistance usually prevent formal relationships from being established.

Having the CMOC as a part of day to day humanitarian assistance operations will allow participants to build those relationships that will be necessary to overcome the coordination challenges of providing support. “Civil Military Operations are about engaging the population and building relationships”<sup>34</sup> that go beyond the immediate situation. The schism, which currently exists, between the military and the other players in the humanitarian assistance operational environment is not unlike the challenges faced in counterinsurgency operations in the context of integrating the key players into the various phases of operations.

Unity of effort in the humanitarian assistance operational environment will not be maximized while military leaders continue to think in the context of the traditional command and control (C2) methodology. Civil-Military Operations, as they relate to humanitarian assistance, must be viewed as a priority when it comes to contingency planning not simply done as resources permit. It is critical that military leaders and planners seize the opportunity

in the humanitarian assistance arena to leverage the military's capabilities and mobility in a supporting role enabling U.S. government agencies' efforts to advance national interests.

### The Opposing View: Warfare or Aid

Since its inception the military has served one main purpose, to fight and win its nation's wars. The use of the military forces to conduct humanitarian assistance operations requires a significant amount of time and resources that many would argue the military cannot guarantee to provide or sustain. USAID is the lead agency for U.S. foreign humanitarian assistance support. The Fiscal Year (FY) 13 budget proposals for the "DOS/USAID were 51.6 billion dollars"<sup>35</sup> and "613.9 billion dollars for the DOD"<sup>36</sup>.

Military support for humanitarian assistance operations is based primarily on personnel and resource availability; whether it is disaster related or an exercise. The military, as a force, does not generally train its personnel for humanitarian assistance operations and support. USAID, on the other hand routinely works with public/private nongovernmental organizations in support of disasters and long term projects around the world. Only 5.8 percent of USAID's budget totaling 1.307 billion dollars was allocated to foreign disaster assistance in FY 10.<sup>37</sup> Although, the DOD's budget is much larger than USAID's, the DOD does not allocate the amount of funds or the personnel.

However, personnel availability concerns will continue to be factors that influence the DOD and other U.S. government agencies when it comes to supporting humanitarian assistance operations, but the effects of future budget cuts will impact the DOD far less. It is expected that the DOD will continue to have a lion's share of the fiscal and material resources needed to conduct and sustain humanitarian assistance operations in the future. Government

agencies like USAID will depend on the military in the future to provide more support in stability operations, in particular humanitarian assistance, due to reductions in organic capabilities and resources as a result of the projected future budget cuts.

The military, especially at the theater commander level, must continue to be a forward looking flexible force that operates using the whole of government approach to solving not only future conflicts, but also being prepared to fill the gaps where needed by other government agencies. “U.S. foreign policy has tended to over-rely on hard power”<sup>38</sup> and has failed to accurately portray the U.S. military as a vital player in soft power projection. Humanitarian Assistance is just one area that theater commanders and joint planners must be prepared to engage with a different focus, which requires supporting through ‘soft power’ not the traditional ‘hard power’, more band aids than bullets.

### Conclusions and Recommendations

The military can no longer be satisfied with only responding after disasters or merely conducting exercises with host nations. Humanitarian Assistance goes beyond disasters and medical readiness training exercises. The relationships built during these exercises must be leveraged into opportunities for the military in conjunction with the other elements of national power to help build local nation capacity. To address the seams between the military, DOS/USAID, and the other humanitarian assistance providing organizations requires a change in the concept the military describes as command and control (C2) on the theater commanders’ staffs. As a part of the process in ‘Re-thinking Humanitarian Assistance Operations’, it is time for theater commanders to move beyond the traditional command, control, and intelligence constructs and incorporate ‘Humanitarian Affairs Operations’ as a

required element. This change must be supported with joint doctrine. Updated and new joint doctrine will help build consistency between the different theaters of operations. Humanitarian Affairs Operations will underpin and help build the situational awareness picture of the operational environment focusing on the “human space”<sup>39</sup> as the commander begins to see beyond the kinetics and combatants.

The experiences gained from past humanitarian disasters and exercises are instrumental in building a cadre of professionals in the military that will be needed to support future operations. The ability of the U.S military in particular to conduct humanitarian or combat operations globally with organic resources, allows the U.S. to project power that can be expressed in hard or soft terms. In order to share the information gathered from the ‘human space’ the Civil-Military Operations Center must be a full time center in all theaters of operations that move past coordination driven by disasters, but becomes a focal point that ties directly into the Commander’s decision cycle.

A Humanitarian Affairs Director should be appointed to lead the effort in each theater of operations with the same access and seniority as the Political Adviser. Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught military leaders that traditional military ‘hard power’ is not enough, but it takes ‘soft power’ to truly win the hearts and minds of the populace. The local people are the “center of gravity”<sup>40</sup> for Counterinsurgency and Humanitarian Operations. In comparison, humanitarian assistance operations also allow the military through soft power to build those relationships that help defeat the social and economic conditions at the root of many conflicts.

## Final Remarks

As a function of ‘National Power Projection’, theater commanders must utilize the world stage provided by humanitarian assistance opportunities to show the world the values and commitment of the U.S. in helping build allies’ and partner nations’ capacity. It is vitally important that the military, working in a whole of government context, take full advantage of the opportunities, not only to help those in need, but to also help those other government agencies that lack the fiscal and material resources to conduct humanitarian assistance operations alone. In the future, having an aircraft carrier on the horizon will not be enough to deter aggression or conflict. Utilizing those relationships built through humanitarian assistance operations and ‘soft power’ will be the main enablers leading to peaceful solutions, making the current deterrence requirement of an aircraft carrier less likely.

## Notes

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- <sup>1</sup> Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2011), Redefining America's Military Leadership*, [http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2011-02/020811084800\\_2011\\_NMS-08\\_FEB\\_2011.pdf](http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS-08_FEB_2011.pdf) (accessed 08 March 2012), 15.
- <sup>2</sup> Humanitarian support community includes all the organizations that typically participate in humanitarian assistance operations (U.S military, U.S. government agencies, non-government organizations (NGO), et al).
- <sup>3</sup> Theater Commander will be used vice Unified/Geographic Commander
- <sup>4</sup> Operational Reach - For any operation, there is a finite range beyond which predominant elements of the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations. (JP 3-07, II-15)
- <sup>5</sup> Hard power means kinetic weapons (conventional missiles, bombs, rockets, etc).
- <sup>6</sup> Soft power means non kinetic methods.
- <sup>7</sup> Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 29 September 2011), III-1.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., III-18.
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